Introduction
The country of Nepal was never formally lncorporated Into the boundaries of the British Empire. Accordingly•. based on state records. ethnographers have assumed that the community and domestic production remained relatively autonomous until 1951 when the Royal fanilly regained control of the country from the autocratic rule of the Thapa and Rana Prime Minister families.
Our work. focusing on the merchant town of Bandipur in west· central Nepal. uncovered quite a different picture of domestic production and rural economy. We based our historical work on 200 years of business records stored away in the musty cupboards of the shops of merchants. These records include ledgers, letters. purchase orders and receipts, railroad freight bills. shipping insurance documents, court and other litigation records. and tax and land records. They also include many bundles of promissory notes recording, in addition to loans, credit given to the villagers for purchases of fabric from the merchants.
Previously. the usually accepted sources of documentation ahout the state have been official govenunent records. ancient and not so ancient engravings. and so forth. But if the state is oonsldered in terms of a combination of interests struggling with each other for hegemony.2 then official records are biased by the particular interest or alliance of interests In control of the state. They show the struggle of the divided ·subaltem-3 or opposition interests. with their own counter· hegemonies. from the Standpoinf of t~.. 1-:;m.iuant Interest mainly by Inference. The merchant records, while generally not -official" documents. prOVide documentation for the extension and rise of a majOr new fonn of state representing the global dominance of capital. as It was experienced In Nepal. Importantly. the documMlts give insight Into the struggle of capital to establish its control and legitimacy in the count.ry5lde. For Bandlpur and other Newar bazaars. and the surrounding villages that came under their Influence. the S1EPHEN L. MIKESELL AND JAM UNA SHRESTI-IA MERCANTILISM AND DOMESTIC INDUSTRY 19 documents show the content beneath ethnographic descriptions which have too oft~l"elD8Jned on the level of appearances.
These promissory notes record in Increasing detail from at least one and a half centurtes the nature of commodlties traded. credit and loans, rates allnterest, forms of collateral. names of the shopkeepers and their stores. and the names of villager buyers and their -,-mages. In addiUon to the kinds. values and volumes of doth sold. the rates of surplus (or explaUation) and peonl indicating the changmg relaUonship of labor and capital can also be calculated (roffi the ledgers. The self conscious ideological form of the new hegemony is indicated In the wording of contracts between the producers and the merchants. The letters between the various merchants present a picture of the complex trade relations within Nepal. Letters between Nepal! merchants and couunlssion agents in India lndlcate the manner and extent to which the Nepali merehants 'MlTe Integrated into the bazaars of British India.
The picture painted by the documents is, first of all. that from the early 19th century. fabrics from the factories of Britain were already entering into the Nepali countrySide from British India. And. while one can presently see the extcnt of the merchants' landholdings In the west-central region of Nepal. the records show that the usury and expropriaUon of 'Wealth and land Involved in the trade of the IndustrtaJ fabrics increasingly established the merchants as an lmportant force in the state. but in the form of the hegemonic interests of the state and caste Ideology. not of their merchant capital. The merchants displaced the control of Chetrt landlords over landed propeny. entered some of their sons In the government as officers.
used their wealth to influen~other offictals. and based their legitimacy in noUons of Hindu DhannJc suzerainty in alliance with Brahman priests. The assertion of a naUonal bourgeoisie class from its base In the bazaars In BritiSh India durtng the last three decades of BriUsh rule (Ray 1988) gave birth to a trnnsformation of scale and content of merclla.nt acUvity in Nepal as \\-"Cll.
WhUe the merchants did not unUl recently directly apply their capital to producUon in Nepal.4 their trade in industrtally produced fabrics imponed. from British and. later. Euro-American. Japanese and Indian factortes meant that they no longer existed autonomous from producUon In the manner of mercantlle capital prtor to the Industrial revolution. Rather. their trade and. through it. production in Nepal became Increaslng!y subordinated to industrial capital and its reproducUon. These points have been overlooked when the merchants are analyzed In their own terms-for example, of ·survivals· of Newar culture.
LeWIs and Shakya (1988) , as a case in poInt. writc that the industrial fabrtc trade -has reduced many Newar lrading families to being mere middlemen supplying lmponed goods· (italics added).
when by definition tntders are middlemen. The dilference between the trade of precapltalist domestically produced commodIUes and thooe of industrtal capitalists IS that In the former case the merchants merely middlemen who traded goods between various relaUvely Independent communities without themselves controlling production 10 these communlttes. Their profits came by exploiting the communll.les through the trade Itself: purchasing cheap and selling dear. In the latter case. the trade becomes the last stage In the circulation of commodities represented In the production process. II Is through the merchants that the value of the commodities produced In the factories Is realized as money for the factory owners. who then purchase new machlnes. raw materials. and labor power to begm production again on an ever increasing scale. The merchant profits come to the merchant as a share of the surpluS" extracted from the factory workers in the labor process. For the factory owner. these surpluses that he pays out to the merchants are just another cost of doing business. As we will sec. a destruction of domestic Industry that Lewis and Shakya want to emphastze resulted from this subordination of the merchants -and through them. the countryside -to large· scale industry.
While this new kind of trade did not destroy the community in fOrnl. allOwing anthropologists to descrtbe it in terms of a hypothetical traditional culture. by the 19305 (two decades before the so-called revolutionary opening of Nepal to the west) their trade had essentially ruined most cloth production In the sUJTOundlng villages. ThIS separation of lndustry and agriculture Implied that consumption of cloth and other goods. and therefore production and reproduction within the vtllage. had become incorporated. into the circulation of industrial production.
The Gbardu under the Ranas and the Saraswatl Factory In BandJpur It was In this context of a domestic industry devastated by foreign commodity Imports. that In the early 1930s the Prime Minister of Nepal. Juddha Shamsher Raoa (reigned 1932-44) . instituted a last ditch program to save this domestic Industry (prasad 1975) . In a futile effort to develop a measure of economic freedom and self sufficiency. and to salvage the collapsing hegemonic basts of his regime in landed property and the vtllage communtty. he InfUated a range of programs aimed at reviving production in the countryside and laying a basis for large-scale industrial production.
In 1939 the Prime Minister fonned a -Cottage Industry Department-(Gharelul. which was to organize and dcvelop both old and new village industries. This program was to ostensibly serve the Interests and promote the economic well·belng of the vmagers by reviving the once nourishing cloth weaving industry which had disinlegrated in the onslaught or Imported rabrlcs. Thc Cotlage Industry Department was to supply raw materials and mechanical 8. In thIS factory. whomever wants to take the training and. If after training. they want to have a loom in their own home. they will be trained without fee. Whomever wants to work In the factory. they will get paJd monthly. according to the factory rules. In this factory. you can get different kinds of domestically produced cloth and pnnted Damar Kuman Sari. and many kinds of thread are available In this ractory. whomever wants to take the training and _after training If they want to have a loom In their own home, they will be traJned without fee. Whomever wants to work in the factory themselves, they will get paid monthly. according to the factory rules.
in this factory. you can get different kinds of domestically produced cloth and printed Damar Kumart Sarl. and many kinds of thread are available. Look at the sample and try to contribute to the factory. The partners hired a master weaver. Hart Bhakta Shrestha. from Cheuapati, Kathmandu to buDd the looms and oversee production. Now a small kinara owner, he describes how Bishnu Lal Subba was originally inspired by a government run factory In Kathmandu In 1942. He used his position of subba to elicit the aid of the government and organize the factory. It took the four families the year of 1942-1943 to construct the factory building. It was an approximately sixty meter long, two story brick struClure with a series of rooms opening onto a long porch in front on the lower level (half of which remains). The second story sunJlarly opens onto a long covercd balcony which makes looms to tlle villagers at cheap prices and on easy payment t.enns. The viUagers were to then sen back the futl8hed products. They were to be organtze4 in tndustrta.l cooperatl~assoctatJons which would provide the raw materials, tools, and marketing facllitles. According to letters sent between his wholesaler brothers. Shyam Krishna and Hira Lal Pradhan. the merchants were interested In the factory because the Nepali government had imposed quotas and was supplying subsidized thread to the villagers in order to encourage the development of domestic producuon. The letters document how the merchants used their connections, influence, and wealth to obtain bulk quantities of the subsidized thread. Simultaneously with the construction of the textile factory, they were struggling to receive irnJXlrt quotas and gain control over wholesale and retail markets for Imported cloth in the surrounding countryside. They were also hoarding fabrics controlled by quotas to force prices up. The textile factory was part of their strategy to -make money any way you can.-as reiterated in their letters -i.e.. to make profits and reproduce capital. Thts also included black marketeertng. currency manipulation. and hoarding of commodities.
The clerk. merchants and district subba presented their factory as a cooperative association meant to educate the villagers and encourage the development of Indigenous production. as indicated in the factory letterhead and receipt {illustrations I & 21. but they themselves took the surplus In the fonn of profits. This was petfecUy legitimate according to the logic of Juddha Shamsher's program. which was almed at developing an Industrial capltaUst class. Ho-wever. his intent seemed to have been to develop this class from the producers themselves and not to strengthen the already existing mercantile capitalists. ... But in India. from the fifteenth of January or the first of Maagh. they are going to discontinue to control system. It Is in the news of the indian government. What Is going to happen, nobody can say. Whatever happens, take profit and sell whatever you have. That 'WOuld be the best idea. Even If they abolish the control system. you may not get goods soon. And again. we may not even get (the things) at the same prtee, because they have increased the price of raw cotton. Therefore, you do not have to sell the goods at a kiss. From India. they are going to abolish the control system. But here. they have increased the prices of all the goods. I cannot understand anything. I1 ... About the control thread. they have sent an order from Nepal to Pokhara to sell it. You may get the news from the post or from the Gorkha Patra.... And the wage for dhamt is 5 paisa pel" mile. So count the miles carefully. The rate of thread they will fix from Nepal .... 12 ... please send me two copies of the finger prints of you left and right hands to get the application for the thread.l 3
Once the Congress Government came (0 power in India. It soon forced the Nepal government to end (he quota system on fabric Imparts and stop the thread subsidies. allowing again an uncontrolled flood of foreign and. especially. Indian lexUles Into Nepal. The letters of the Shyam Krishna and Hlra Lal indicate that they liquidated their prevtously hoarded texUle stocks In anticipation.
... Nowadays the things are nol like before. Sell the things that you have at home 800n and make a profiJ. Do not keep in stock. We do not know what is going to happen. The Congress" government is trying to break the quota system. Mahatma Gandhi is trytng his best, and I do not think that It will take a long time to break the control. If it takes a long time. it 8tm will not last more than two to three months. But even If the control breaks, and then you will not be getUng so much malertal from India because there will not be enough booking on the train. There may nOl be so many thJngs coming from India. So It is better to seU what you have at home. So sell all the thread too. 14 ... Sell the cigarettes ... It is not profitable just to keep them.
Mter the cigarettes from Thort arrive, the price of cigarettes is going to fall. Now you do nOl have so many customers, so I did not think It was such a good Idea to send a lot of goods. Now there 1s rumor that the control may break. The quota things WIll all be In the market again. That is why we Just cannot take the material for Maagh and PhaaIgun now. If you can sell things, then I will send them to you. A lot of goods are coming from Utassa. It does not appear that the price will go up. So it is not a good idea to take things now and keep them. Just take the profit and sell the things you have now. Nobody can say anything tomorrow. The Congress Government is going to break the controL And the quota controlled things w1ll be distributed in the villages pretty soon. Mter a month you can get 2 and 1 numbered things. Mier the quota things come onto the market. )IOU will not be able to sell any of the black market goods..•. 15 ... The cloth Controls were abolished yesterday. But from one region to another. In Nepal [Kathmandu] . they are still giving by the quota system. Even if the quota system were to break. you would not get the goods. Maybe after one or two months, you can get them. But even if you can get them, you cannot take them from one to another region. And the price may even rise one and one·half times. We got the things at the control rate.
The merchants of this place also think the same thing. Even if the control is abolished, It will not make any difference for Nepal {KaUtmandul. But I think that after four to six months, something will happen. So whatever you have, try to sell and get out of stock. The quota goods we have, we will not lose anything on that.... Th~goods we have. try to sell soon. But do not discount them. Even if Ute control Is abolished. you cannot get the things, and it seems that the rate Is going to be higher than the control rate. Again, they have not controlled fully for Nepal. So think this over, and \\/Ork aceordJngly from it.IS They were joined in this by all the other large wholesalers in Bandlpur. The prices dropped. and the men;hants saw larger profits
In the fabrics Imported from tht' large factories of india, Europe. the United States. and Japan, if not the futility of continuing their production.
DIscussIon
BlaUdc ct al. (1980 -sce note 5) werC essentially correct when they attrlbutcd the failure of the Bandlpur textile factory to foreign couunodity trade and industry, though they did not sufficiently emphasize the merchant partJClpants' VJilllng collaboration In this.
For the merchants, at least. if not Bishnu La1 Subba, the construction of the factory was not an attempt~to revive the once vigorous cotton-weaving industry of Bandipur~~lande et aI. 1980: 126) . Weighing potential surplus against the capital fnvested (the rate of proflt). and not the goals of the Gharelu program, at all Urnes seemed to determine the merchant participation In the Saraswati Factory. Thread subsidies and strict quota controls over imports made It profitable. They had no Interest In developing the autonomy of the Nepali countrySide as envisioned by Juddha Shamsher. In practice, they were shifting production from the household into the direct control of capital, using the Gharelu program as Its basis. and thereby attempting to transfonn their lndtrect mediatiOn by trade of textile commodities Into a direct one of wage labor as a commodJty.
As noted above. the labor force eventually came to consist mostly of women. Thus. the factory In particular and the Gharelu in general not only shifted textile production into the domaln of capital, but it took a sector of production controlled by women and shifted it over to the control of the patriarchal interests and relations which already characterized merchant capital indigenously and industrial capitalism globally. The production and knowledge of the women entered Into the control of male ownertl and managertl. and their products as commodities came under the control of male merchants. The factory owners apparently eventually took the gender relations VJithln the household and domestic skiJls of the women as their basis.
The new gender medJation of women In the 5araswatl Factory underlines the significance of the destruction of the domestic textile industry In undemtining women's autonomy. In recent decades, this has turned out to be a double edged sword 10 Asia. WhIle transnational corporations have presupposed the same conditions as the basis of recruiting a vulnerable and unorganized female labor force in order to destroy organized labor In western Europe, the United States, Japan. and now in the Newly Industrialized Countries, the women of Asia and elsewhere In the third \\/Odd have bcgun to organize, often far more militantly then lhelr maIe counterparts. 17
The historical experience of capitalism globally bas been the expansion of the domain of capital from the products of Industry to industry itself, from the products of labor as commodities to labor Itself as a commodity, and from mediation between communities to the basis of colTUnunlty. That the bazaar merchants of BandJpur were unable to uansform themselves into a national tndustrlal class resulted because their trade presupposed and based Itsdf on already developed induslrlaI capital elsewhere. WhUe the large merchant houses of India such as Blrla. Tata and so forth used the bazaar as a basis to take the opportunity of g10bal crises in capltallsm to enter into direct partne~hJp with foreign capitalists (Ray 1988) . the BandJpUf" merchants only expanded their trade with India (whUe the palace has been trying to flll the role of state monopoUst).
Their expansion of direct control over the ccuntrysJde continued to take the form of expansion of landholdings and usury. nol of capital appUed directly to production. The men::antile capital presupposed the same dlrect peasant production assumed by the landed ruling interests of the state. By the time that Juddha Shamsher attempted to implement his Ghardu and other programs, the interests represented in the industrlal class d~pment in India and a dependent fonn of mercantlle class development within Nepal 'Were already too far developed.
Another important structwal difference of the 5araswati factory from domestic production was its dependence on imported thread. Thus. from the viewpoint of Indian factories. the Saraswati factory and.
for that matter. the Gharelu program. consumed the thread 88 the last step in the commodJty circulation represented by industria.l production that was show above to have characterized the merchant trade; This pofnt is emphasized by the immense trade of both quota and other threads into the countryside that was being ca.rrfed out by the merchants simultaneous to and after the Saraswati factory. as documented in their letters. In the latter period, the merchants were constantly calculating whether they could more profitably weave the thread on their own looms or Just sell it in the villages.
The significance of this discussion for anthropologists Is that community and culture in Nepal cannot be analyzed In their own terms. Even prior to the entry of industrial capItalist interests in the fonn of mercantile capitalism Into Nepal. the state contained various interests whIch controlled peasant surpluses. These Included, at the least. merchants and the hegemonic landed property groups. After the rise of industrial capltaUsm in western Europe, the community in Nepal became Increasingly mediated by the bazaar and merchants representing foreign Industrial capltaUst interests in the fonn of Industrial conunodlties and mercantile profits, usury, and rents. By the 19308 this was a process that even the Rana rulers of Nepal were forced to acknowledge 8S they found their hegemonic basis erodJng away. The subsequent change of regtmes and de~lopment of the state and community have been shaped by th18 growing dominance. Anthropologists cannot analyze the-conunl!nity in tsolatlon from this larger totality: they must undentand the latter theoretically. WhUe every partJcular analysts need not be a study of the totality. the anthropologist must undersland Gramsel's (1971) &rhere are other examples of atlemp~hy famlUes In Bandlpur to organize joWt corporate ownership hut to have them fai1 as lndJvtdual family Inlerests overrode the collective one. Presently capital ill also organtzed In the frame1IIOrk ol5(1l1gcU "together" lor In.approprlately "jolnt"J families ....hlch s1m1larly IntroduCtl a contradiction into the lendency of capital to concentrate OWllership and producUon ...hen the families b~ak lrlto chuttai "broken" lor Inappropriately "nuclear") famUles. As Mane pointed out. tWs Is a dialectical contradiction. because \( eventuaUy leads to greater
